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Abstract 
China’s energy-service companies (ESCOs) have developed only modestly despite favorable 
political  and  market  conditions.  We  argue  that  with  sophisticated  market  institutions  still 
evolving in China, trust-based relations between ESCOs and energy customers are essential 
for successful implementation of energy efficiency projects. Chinese ESCOs, who are pre-
dominantly small and private enterprises, perform poorly in terms of trust-building because 
they are disembedded from local business, social, and political networks. We conclude that in 
the current institutional setting, the ESCO model based on market relations has serious limita-
tions and is unlikely to lead to large-scale implementation of energy efficiency projects in 
China. 
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1  Introduction 
Experts, academics, and industry leaders generally agree that the market for energy-service 
companies  (ESCOs)
1  has  a  huge  potential  in  China  (Gan  2009,  Li  &  Colombier  2009). 
China’s ratio of energy use to GDP (i.e., energy intensity) is one of the highest in the world, 
1.5 times the world average (IEA 2010). This considerable discrepancy between China’s en-
ergy consumption per capita and that of developed economies points to untapped potential to 
improve the country’s energy efficiency. 
The Chinese government has also been stressing and actively supporting energy efficiency 
measures in the last decade. In 2006, the National People’s Congress approved the incorpora-
tion of a self-imposed national energy intensity reduction target in the 11
th Five-Year Plan, 
and the central government signed contracts with 1000 of China’s highest energy-consuming 
enterprises to increase energy efficiency.
2 In April 2010, the State Council issued Document 
No.  25  calling  for  an  accelerated  development  of  China’s  energy  saving  service  industry 
(State Council Document No. 25, 2010).
3 In addition to these formally promulgated targets 
and national commitments, provincial governments and cities such as Beijing and Shanghai 
have formulated additional local policies to support the ESCO industry. For instance, in 2008, 
Shanghai set up a special fund to promote ESCO projects (Chen & Xu 2010, p. 2). 
Under such favorable market and political conditions, one would expect ESCOs to thrive. 
Yet, the development of the ESCO industry in China is far from reaching its significant poten-
tial (Gan 2009, Li & Colombier 2009, Limaye & Limaye 2011) and even lags behind that of 
other  developing  countries.  For  instance,  even  though  Brazil’s  primary  energy  demand  is 
roughly 11% of China’s and its energy intensity about half of China’s (IEA 2010), Brazil’s 
ESCO industry dwarfs China’s by a factor of over two (Delio et al. 2009, p. 12). Despite all 
of the potential, ESCOs have remained largely a marginal player in delivering energy effi-
ciency goals in China. Some even claim Chinese ESCOs are a case of market failure with a 
limited ability to implement energy efficiency at a large scale (Hasnie 2009 quoted in USAID 
2010, p.11, World Bank 2010). This begs the questions: why has the ESCO industry been a 
                                                 
1 An energy service company (ESCO) is generally defined as a company which invests in, or facilitates invest-
ments in, energy efficiency projects in other host enterprises, using energy performance contracting (World 
Bank 2008, p. 1). ESCOs in China are also referred to as energy management companies (EMCs). 
2 For an overview of the national Top-1000 Enterprise Program, see Price et al. (2010). For an overview of 
China’s energy efficiency policy, see Zhou, Levine, and Price (2010) and Meidan et al. (2009). 
3The policies outlined in Document No. 25 were followed by numerous guidelines and rules promoting the en-
ergy-saving service industry. In June 2010, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and 
the Ministry of Finance (MoF) jointly issued the ‘Interim Measures concerning the Administration of Finan-
cial Incentives to Fund the Energy Performance Contracting’. In August 2010, the General Administration of 
Quality  Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine  issued  ‘General Technical  Rules  for Energy Performance 
Contracting’. These different interim measures and technical rules indicate the central government’s political 
will to promote China’s ESCO industry. In the interim measures by the NDRC and MoF, the stated develop-
ment goal is to develop a few large scale ESCOs by 2012. Specific financial and tax incentives outlined in-
clude offering RMB 240 for 1 ton of standard coal equivalent as an financial incentive for ESCOs from the 
central finance budget and exempting ESCOs from business tax for revenue generated from Energy Perform-
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disappointment in China? How can the industry fulfill a valuable role in reaching energy effi-
ciency goals?  
Based on on-site fieldwork, this article develops an analytical framework to explain why 
ESCOs in China do not operate efficiently or effectively in the market. Using the theories of 
asymmetric information (Akerlof 1970, Rothschild & Stiglitz 1976), transaction cost (Coase 
1937, Williamson 1975, 1985) and network embeddedness (Granovetter 1985), we hypothe-
size that trust generated through social networks and relations enables firms to overcome a 
general market failure in the Chinese ESCO industry, and it is precisely the lack thereof in 
many private ESCO firms that undermines their growth potential. Public ESCOs or those 
spun off of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are in a better position to serve clients, the major-
ity of whom are government agencies, public institutions, and heavy industries (which are 
usually SOEs), and scale up rapidly because they are embedded in networks that foster trust. 
Our findings suggest that the ESCO industry in China is characterized by a system of rela-
tional governance based on trust. Yet, most participants have been operating their business as 
if they are in a system of market governance or have been busy trying to recreate such a sys-
tem, essentially monocropping the one they were accustomed to in countries where the ESCO 
sector first originated. This institutional mismatch is the most critical challenge for the indus-
try’s growth. 
The analysis draws from over 30 interviews in 2011 with Chinese and international ESCOs 
located in Beijing, Hebei, Baoding (Hebei), and Dalian (Liaoning), members of the Chinese 
Energy Management Company Association (EMCA), and energy experts. Four cases, each 
representing a distinct mode of ESCO operation, are selected for in-depth study to understand 
the role of trust and networks in China’s ESCO industry. The selected cases are “most differ-
ent” in their ownership form, size, and regional location and highlight how different charac-
teristics affect ESCOs’ ability to get access to and develop business opportunities. Interviews 
were semi-structured and provided an understanding of ESCOs’ existing networks and how 
they build and maintain client relations. The analysis also draws from policy documents, gov-
ernment reports, and media reports.  
The next section summarizes recent market trends in the ESCO industry in China. The 
subsequent discussion provides an overview of the concepts and theories used in the paper to 
understand how ESCOs operate in a market with less sophisticated market institutions. The 
paper then analyzes how four ESCOs operate in the public and private sphere. The research 
concludes that in markets with unsophisticated intermediaries such as in China, the establish-
ment of trust-building networks is essential for ESCOs to work effectively. 
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2  Context 
Table 1 summarizes the state of China’s ESCO industry.  
Table 1: ESCO Activity in China  
Year  ESCOs 
(Numbers) 
Total  Value  of 
ESCO  Projects 
(in million US$) 
Annual  Investments  in 
Energy  Performance 
Contracting (in mn US$) 
Tons  of  standard 
coal  reduced 
(Mtce) 
1998  3  0  4  0 
2001  3  50  4  N/A 
2003  3  270  22  N/A 
2004  60  514  94  6 
2005  106  723  242  14 
2006  134  1,263  277  15 
2007  185  3,314  1,033  53 
2008  N/A  6,386  1,786  N/A 
2009  502  8,994  2,989  N/A 
2010  N/A  12,798  4,400  N/A 
2011  523  N/A  N/A  N/A 
Source: Delio et al. (2009), EMCA (2011), Gan (2009), World Bank (2008), Chen and Xu (2010), FT (2010) 
 
Although it is indisputable that the overall number of ESCOs and their investments have been 
growing, these official numbers are misleading. Obtaining reliable numbers is challenging, 
and one has to rely on multiple sources who often do not communicate with each other and 
cite different numbers. For instance, a reputable expert in the field claimed that “there might 
be 10 ESCOs in China” (Interview 051811), while another concurred that most Chinese ES-
COs are not “real ESCOs. ESCOs are supposed to create a unique solution for the client, but 
Chinese ESCOs just sell the product that they make” (Interview 051211). On the other ex-
treme, in March 2011, the central government’s list of officially approved ESCOs totaled 984 
(NDRC and Ministry of Finance, 2010 and 2011).
4 Most observers believe the majority of 
these are “phantom” companies merely taking advantage of the ESCO status to receive finan-
                                                 
4 It is difficult to lump Chinese ESCOs into one category. First, one needs to distinguish between technology-
oriented and market-oriented ESCOs (or vendor vs. service ESCOs), with the former selling specialized tech-
nologies and equipment and the latter working together with energy consumer companies to solve particular 
energy efficiency problems. Second, ESCOs are owned by private companies, state-owned enterprises, non-
profit organizations, or local governments, with many different shades of ownership in between. A third dis-
tinction is between domestic and foreign companies, as larger international energy companies such as Honey-
well, Siemens, and Schneider Electronics have also entered the Chinese ESCO market. Fourth, the size and 
investment capacity of ESCOs differ substantially. Moreover, the contractual model adopted by ESCOs can 
range from shared savings (mainly in the building sector), to outsourcing energy management (commercial 
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cial and tax benefits that were introduced in 2010 to promote the ESCO industry (Interview 
051211). According to experts, “these ESCOs know almost nothing about energy perform-
ance  contracts  (EPC)”  (Interview  051211),  and  “70-80%  have  never  done  ESCO-related 
work” (Interview 050811). A long-time industry insider put it rather succinctly: “Everyone is 
called an ESCO” (Interview 051211).  
The consensus among industry experts is that China’s ESCO industry is rather underdevel-
oped. On average, ESCOs in China remain small,
5 are concentrated in a few big cities,
6 and 
offer only a standardized, “copy and paste” (Interview 051211) solution to their clients using 
a simple technology (Interview 051811). According to a regional manager of a large foreign 
ESCO operating in China, “China is at the stage where North America was in 1995. Instead of 
offering entire energy solutions by combining different systems together, current investments 
are made only in standardized energy-saving projects such as changing light bulbs, motors, or 
broilers” (Interview 051211). Many ESCOs “do not dare to change entire production proc-
esses, as in the beginning it is much easier for clients to accept smaller changes” (Interview 
051011).  Different  studies  thus  describe  China’s  ESCO  industry  as  “immature  and  short-
sighted” (Li & Colombier 2009, p. 2), lacking technical skills and capacity (Wang et al. 2008, 
p. 1881), predominantly selling energy efficiency products instead of services (World Bank 
2008, Li & Colombier 2009), and “lack[ing] the capability to contribute large-scale energy 
efficiency on the demand side” (USAID 2007, p. 21).  
Existing research attributes the stunted market development in China to market, financial, 
institutional, technological, and educational barriers as well as poor energy pricing policies 
(Wang et al. 2008, Singh et al. 2009, Limaye & Limaye 2011). The overriding view in the 
literature is that once these barriers are lifted, ESCOs will be well equipped to help China 
improve its energy efficiency. The underlying assumption is that what the Chinese ESCOs 
need are simply the “right” market conditions: a highly marketized system of governance 
supported by well-functioning financial intermediaries and legal institutions to enforce con-
tracts. While these barriers may be important for the long-term growth of the ESCO industry 
in China, this paper emphasizes the role of transaction costs and social networks as important 
features currently shaping market outcomes. We need to understand how the market actually 
functions before offering prescriptions. To this end, this paper offers an analytical framework 
to understand the current workings of the market.  
 
                                                 
5 According to EMCA, the financial capacity of Chinese ESCOs is limited: 60% of the ESCOs have less than 10 
million yuan registration capital; 20% has more than 50 million yuan registration capital. About 50% of ES-
COs have less than 100 employees (Interview 051811). 
6 Of the 984 approved ESCOs in 2011, 461 (47%) were located in Northern and Eastern China with 153 in Bei-
jing and 63 in Shanghai alone, 132 (13%) located in Southern China, 228 (23%) in Central China, and 163 
(17%) in Western China. The majority of ESCOs are located away from energy intensive provinces. For in-
stance, the high energy intensive provinces Inner Mongolia, Henan, and Shanxi have four, 34, and 30 ESCOs 
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3  Transaction costs, networks, and trust  
3.1  China’s ESCO Industry: Asymmetric Information and High Transac-
tion Costs 
Most ESCOs in China operate in an environment where transaction costs are extremely 
high. There are several sources of high transaction cost, but three are most fundamental: i) a 
new product or service whose quality is hard to discern; ii) the eclectic nature of the product 
itself; and iii) the long-term and recurrent nature of transactions when outcomes are perceived 
to be uncertain because of the above two reasons.  
First, the ESCO industry is relatively new in China and “no one understands the name ES-
CO” (Interview 051211). The majority of ESCOs are less than two years old (AFD 2008a). 
From product and service to technology to financing mechanism, an ESCO “product” is a 
novel concept to most Chinese clients. Nonetheless, novelty in and of itself does not create 
high transaction costs. In the case of an ESCO, it is novelty combined with the sophisticated 
and non-commodified nature of its product that creates high transaction costs. ESCOs usually 
thrive on unique technologies, products, and financing methods. In highly marketized West-
ern economies, ESCOs realize their growth potentials essentially by carving out a niche in the 
market through provision of customized solutions to clients. In China, however, such an ap-
proach may not be an advantage. From a consumer’s perspective, the quality of an ESCO 
product is very difficult to discern – a classical case of asymmetric information (Akerlof 
1970, Rothschild & Stiglitz 1976). In fact, many market observers and experts criticize that 
Chinese customers (and financial institutions) distrust ESCO activities (AFD 2008c, p. 8, Gan 
2009, p. 1698, Limaye & Limaye 2011, p. 143). But, their criticism is misplaced; customers 
simply  do  not  understand  what  an  “ESCO  product”  is  or  how  to  evaluate  it  (Interview 
051811). A general manager of a small Chinese ESCO in Beijing notes that “unlike usual 
projects, where it is easy to estimate the value of the projects, it is really hard to count the 
amount of energy saved, so the banks find it hard to assess the project value. As a result, the 
banks are careful to provide loans to ESCOs” (Interview 052011). Hence, customers and 
banks shy away from entering a contract with an ESCO, resulting in market failure. Even if 
transactions do occur, the market would be in a suboptimal equilibrium. ESCOs that offer 
high quality products and services would particularly suffer, because customers would likely 
lump them together with incompetent ESCOs. If the problem persists, the former might even 
drop out of the market altogether, furthering the downward cycle towards market failure.  
Furthermore, ESCOs work under the banner of “energy service” or “energy management,” 
but in reality, they do not offer a single product. Over the years, the ESCO sector has evolved 
to include many different types of organizations that allegedly use the same “ESCO” concept 
or model, including energy suppliers, engineering firms, equipment manufacturers, building 
management companies, construction management companies, and electric contractors. Under 
the ESCO banner, hundreds of dissimilar services and technologies are offered to customers. 
From the consumer’s perspective, it is again very difficult to evaluate an ESCO product be-
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ucts, the search cost to find the most suitable product is extremely high. All of these result in 
high transaction costs, rendering customers vulnerable.  
Vulnerability cuts both ways, however. It is well documented in transaction cost econom-
ics  that  transactions  characterized  by  complex,  recurrent,  and  long-term  relations  are  fre-
quently jeopardized by “opportunism,”
7 especially when the items being exchanged possess 
qualities that are not easily measured (Williamson 1975, 1985). In other words, there is al-
ways a risk that a party may renege on a contract, and the resulting loss is proportionally 
greater if investment is specific to the transaction. Indeed, one of the most common issues for 
Chinese ESCOs is that Chinese customers do not abide by the original contract (Interview 
041811, Interview 051211). According to the founder of a medium-sized private ESCO, “it is 
very hard to find good energy projects in China as there is little or no payment guarantee. We 
are very strict in picking clients, as our customers have refused agreed payments in the past, 
and it took a lot of time and convincing to eventually get the money back, if at all” (Interview 
052511). Chinese customers are also known to perceive and fear opportunistic behavior on 
the part of ESCOs as well, stemming primarily from the uncertain outcome of the transaction 
(AFD 2008c, Gan 2009). In either case, fearing and expecting that opportunism exists in their 
transaction, the parties refrain from doing business in the first place, which again results in 
market failure.  
In short, an ESCO product or service is far from being adequately defined, let alone stan-
dardized, from the consumer’s perspective. Under the context of imperfect information, long-
term transactions characterized by ESCOs are further plagued by the specter of opportunism. 
The consumers’ inability to evaluate the quality of the good, the lack of credible information, 
the hodgepodge nature of variegated products, the high search cost, and the risk of opportun-
ism naturally create high transaction costs. In these circumstances, one should expect a gen-
eral market disequilibrium, if not market failure.
8 We contend that this is precisely the current 
state of the Chinese ESCO sector.  
 
3.2  Low Sophistication of Intermediaries 
Theoretically, the problems of transaction cost and market failure should be applicable to 
most developing countries where the ESCO sector is relatively new. In other words, there is 
no reason why ESCOs in China should under-perform compared to their counterparts in other 
developing countries. We argue that compared to their counterparts in other developing coun-
tries, under the current economic context, most Chinese ESCOs do not have the means to re-
                                                 
7 In this paper we do not discuss the other problem of “bounded rationality” (Williamson 1985, 1975) because 
the under-development of legal institutions in China is a well-known fact already.  
8 Others also have suggested that there is a market failure in the Chinese ESCO sector. But the conventional 
reasoning behind such a suggestion has been again a long list of “barriers” without explaining how those bar-
riers inherently increase transaction costs (e.g., Hasnie 2009 quoted in USAID 2010). In others words, they 
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duce transaction costs effectively and have done a poor job of doing so, precisely because 
they are private ESCOs. Our research findings show that compared to their private counter-
parts public ESCOs are in a better position to serve clients in large part because they can more 
effectively mitigate transaction costs. 
There are two main channels through which transaction costs are reduced in a market.
9 The 
first is through establishment of intermediaries. In highly developed market economies, these 
are usually legal institutions, financial intermediaries, certification systems, regulatory institu-
tions, and so on. This is precisely the reason why so many ESCO experts and industry leaders 
are exhorting the Chinese government and banks to, among other things, establish a quality 
certification system and revise the “outdated” loan rules (Ürge-Vorsatz et al. 2007, p.13, Gan 
2009, p. 699). 
However, in China today, this route does not seem to be a viable option for ESCOs. First, 
if the history of advanced industrialized countries is any indication, these “hard” institutions 
take decades to develop. Second, the development of intermediaries also requires a high level 
of sophistication and technological knowledge on the part of intermediaries themselves. For 
instance, when banks consider giving loans to ESCOs, they have to evaluate the financial vi-
ability of the product in question, which in turn requires probing into the technical aspects of 
the product. ESCOs themselves bring new, innovative financial instruments to the market, 
which adds more burden on the financial and legal systems to upgrade their ability to handle 
complex financial transactions. In China, such sophistication on the part of intermediaries has 
been almost non-existent. In fact, in the history of market economies, sophistication of institu-
tions has usually been a product of market development and maturation, not the cause (Dem-
setz 1967, Finley 1973, North 1990).  
 
3.3  Networks and Trust 
What most observers of Chinese ESCOs fail to consider is what customers and buyers rely 
on to carry out their transactions in the absence of hard institutions. It is a “soft” institution – 
namely, trust – between the parties that enables market transactions to materialize. Two par-
ties with mutual trust are “willing to be vulnerable” (Mayer et al. 1995), because what they 
trust is not the product in question per se, but the person or organization behind the product. 
From the consumer’s perspective, even if she does not have all of the necessary information 
about product quality, confidence in the seller can impel her to enter a transaction that other-
wise would not have occurred. The seller, expecting that the buyer is not going to renege only 
two years into a ten-year contract, for example, would also be more willing to enter a transac-
                                                 
9 We do not consider the third way – namely, hierarchy or vertical integration (Williamson 1975, 1985) – be-
cause empirically we do not see it in the ESCO sector. In fact, ESCOs – by definition – as entities managing 
energy-related activities on behalf of other companies, are actors in the market interface. From this perspec-
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tion. In other words, trust – a form
10 of social capital
11 (Loury 1977, Bourdieu 1985, Coleman 
1990) – greatly reduces transaction costs by mitigating the problem of lack of credible infor-
mation, by rendering complex details of a contract less imperative, and by reducing or elimi-
nating both ex ante and ex post opportunism.
12 In the extreme case, hard institutions become 
unnecessary, because “[n]o lawyer need apply for business transactions underwritten by this 
source of social capital” (Portes 1998, p. 9). For instance, ESCO contracts in the US are hun-
dreds of pages while in China they are typically two pages. Chinese ESCOs and customers 
tend to fill in the details informally as the project moves forward (Interview 042211). Empiri-
cal studies show that even in economies where well-developed formal institutions exist, trust 
complements them, further improving inter-organizational exchanges (Zaheer & Venkatraman 
1995, Poppo & Zenger 2002).  
Trust in turn is primarily engendered in social relations and networks (Granovetter 1985, 
Coleman 1990, Powell 1990, Burt 1992). This happens in a number of ways. First, social ties 
embedded in networks  facilitate two types of information. Reliable information about the 
quality of the product in question can be obtained through other actors in the network. The 
best such information is that which comes from someone with whom you have had repeated 
interactions and found to be reliable (Axelrod 1984). The other type of information may be 
more  important:  information  about  the  quality  of  the  seller  (or  buyer)  is  also  transmitted 
through networks. A buyer tends to trust someone whom she either knows personally from a 
previous positive experience or who came recommended from someone else in the network. 
In this case, what the buyer trusts is not the quality of the product per se, but the person who 
embodies the product. It is known that Chinese consumers evaluate the trustworthiness of an 
ESCO company rather than the product being offered, prompting some to suggest that they 
are irrational (Gan 2009).  
Second, networks can produce a sort of certification of the actor’s social credentials (Rous-
seau et al. 1998, Lin 1999), especially if it comes from an authority figure within the network. 
When an authority figure “puts in a good word” on behalf of someone, it not only signals in-
formation about the latter’s reliability, but it also reflects the latter’s ability to navigate the 
                                                 
10 There is some controversy and confusion in the literature as to whether trust is a form of social capital (Cole-
man 1990), a source of social capital (e.g., Portes 1998), or a structural feature of network and thus not a form 
of social capital (Lin 1999). Teasing out these differences is an important task, and we do not intend to over-
look these issues. However, we do not engage with this debate in this paper for two reasons. One, it is not im-
mediately relevant to the central thesis of this paper. More importantly for this paper’s central thesis, there is 
no controversy that network ties are an important determinant of relational assets like trust (Granovetter 1985, 
Powell 1990). Most authors do agree that trust – as mediated through networks and relations – is a means 
through which actors can better access and contribute to embedded resources.  
11 In this paper, without evaluating the merits of either schools of thoughts, by social capital, we are strictly fol-
lowing the original concept as developed in sociology that emphasizes social relations and networks as the ba-
sic nexus through which social capital is captured, rather than the later variant developed in political science 
that tends to emphasize organizations and communities (or even nations) (Putnam 1993).  
12 Other authors and experts are thinking along the same line when they stress “commitment” on the part of Chi-
nese consumers as a barrier to ESCO development in China (Gan 2009, Interview 041811). Such a view is 
misplaced. There is no such thing as a blind commitment in market transactions. Commitment is not going to 
be forthcoming when there is a lack of trust (or intermediaries). Sellers must provide consumers reasons to 
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network and “get things done.” Perceiving this, other actors would be more inclined to con-
duct business transactions with such a person. Third, social relations constrain members to be 
beholden to reputation, which manifest itself as a mechanism of social control against malfea-
sance (Coleman 1988, Powell 1990, Portes 1998). In a market overlaid with social relations 
and networks, an act of malfeasance can damage one’s reputation not only in the business 
realm but also in the social realm. Moreover, it can also damage the reputation of others who 
stood behind you. Thus, the collectivity of the network itself acts as a moderator and guaran-
tor that transactions will be honored.  
Recent empirical studies have shown that such a system of relational governance (Dwyer 
et al. 1987, Macneil 1980) mediated through networks and trust is an efficient form of organ-
izational structure (Palay 1984, Saxton 1997, Zaheer et al. 1998). That relational governance 
is relevant in the Chinese economy has also been empirically identified (Wank 2001, Zhou et 
al. 2008). Our empirical research suggests that, especially in the absence of advanced formal 
institutions, the Chinese ESCO market is also characterized by relational governance (Inter-
view 052011). However, to date, most ESCOs in China have been conducting business as if 
they were in a system of market governance. In fact, the involved actors have been trying to 
recreate the market governance model in the West because ESCOs there have developed quite 
successfully (Interview 042511, Interview 051211). This is reflected in two facts: i) almost all 
ESCOs are private enterprises; ii) their propensity to enter the market and deal with customers 
predominantly through market governance supported by written contracts and other legal in-
stitutions.  
In the following section, we use four specific cases to illustrate that the Chinese ESCO 
market is marked by a relational governance structure under the current imperfect market 
situation fraught with asymmetric information and high transaction costs. The case studies 
illustrate why public ESCOs or ESCOs that are subsidiaries of SOEs are better able to reduce 
transaction costs in the Chinese market context and thus might be particularly suited to grow 
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4  Case Studies 
The selected case studies differ in their founding organization. Case study one is a private 
company in Beijing, and is most representative of the sector. Cases 2 and 3 are founded by a 
Chinese non-governmental organization (NGO) and a provincial government, respectively. 
The  two  companies  in  Case  4  are  also  private  companies.  However,  they  are  more  ‘net-
worked’ and thus contrast mostly sharply with Case 1, in spite of the same legal status.  
 
Table 2: Case Study Summary  
  Case 1 
Disembedded 
Private 










Company A; Ruili 




Hebei DRC (with 
USAID support)  
Private 
Location  Beijing   Dalian  Hebei  City  A;  Baoding, 
Hebei 
Investment capacity*  Low  Medium  High  Medium 
Number of clients  TBD   3  TBD   11 
Network scope  Limited  Binodal  Multi-nodal  Multi-nodal 
Main challenges  Opportunism; 
locating  new 
clients 
Expanding  client 
base 
Technical expertise  Expansion  to  other 
regions 
Source: Authors 
4.1  Case 1: Disembedded Private ESCO 
The majority of ESCOs in China are small and privately-owned (World Bank 2008, AFD 
2008b, p. 10). Most of these companies “jumped” into the Chinese ESCO market because of 
China’s rising demand for energy efficiency and hence perceived business opportunities (In-
terview 051211). However, even from the beginning, they face difficulties in penetrating the 
market and building a clientele base, largely because they lack relational resources (Interview 
042211). While they consistently stress the importance of “networks,” “connections,” “rela-
tionship,” “guanxi,” and trust-building, most private ESCOs simply do not know how to form 
such ties (Gan 2009, Interview 041811, Interview 042211, Interview 042511). Interviewees 
emphasized  the  difficulties  in  linking  with  key  customers  and  accessing  financial  credits, 
symptoms of their exclusion from systematic networks and relations. Hence, it is difficult for 
private ESCOs to create institutionalized trust between themselves and customers and finan-
cial institutions. 
Lacking strong networks themselves, private ESCOs then turn to other ways to expand 





Frankfurt School of Finance & Management 
Working Paper No. 168 
 
(Vine 2005, Ürge-Vorsatz et al. 2007,). China also has an association of its own: EMCA. 
However, while EMCA might be functioning as a loose network among many Chinese ES-
COs, the association itself is disembedded from a broader network that encompasses custom-
ers, financial institutions, and public institutions. Therefore, EMCA does not function as an 
institution through which credible information about both ESCOs and customers can be facili-
tated and shared by both parties. In addition, EMCA also lacks the ability to certify members’ 
business or social credentials and does not have the ability to sanction malfeasance.
13 In addi-
tion to EMCA membership, some private ESCOs try to market themselves but they usually 
end up engaging in activities with low profit margins, such as a mere consultancy role (Inter-
view 042211). Many private ESCOs are forced to exit the market within a couple of years 
(Interview  051211)  or  “stop  working  as  an  ESCO  and  just  lease  equipment”  (Interview 
051911), while still insisting that enormous opportunities exist in the market. Most of them do 
not know why they failed; yet, placing the blame on lack of “connections” is nearly unani-
mous (Interview 041811, Interview 042511, Interview 051211). It is safe to deduce that even 
if a typical private ESCO is embedded in some kind of network (e.g., EMCA), it possesses 
neither “dense” ties (Coleman 1990) nor “weak ties” (Granovetter 1973, Burt 1992) through 
which they can advance their interests.  
For example, ClearWorld Energy is a Beijing-based venture capital fund founded in 2003. 
It was incorporated as a subsidiary under the global clean energy provider Camco in 2006, 
and subsequently set up an ESCO to enter the waste recovery business. As with most small 
private ESCOs, ClearWorld had difficulty finding clients and establishing its credibility and 
reputation in the sector. Nonetheless, technologically, the company offered a sound solution 
to clients, as indicated by customer satisfaction and the fact that projects were profitable (In-
terview 041811). The real problem surfaced when the company’s customer relations turned 
sour. After a relatively stable customer relationship that benefited ClearWorld with consistent 
cash  flows  in  the  beginning,  its  customers  –  satisfied  with  the  energy  savings  already 
achieved thus far – suddenly refused to pay anymore. The problem was compounded by the 
fact that a standardized EPC or a sophisticated method to monitor and energy savings do not 
exist in China. According to a Camco employee, the company began to distrust customers 
because “when the client’s factory is 200 miles from the office, we have no way to ensure 
how much  energy  was  saved  and thus our payments are not secure”  (Interview 051011). 
Without customers’ cooperation, ClearWorld was unable to verify any information; hence, 
their return on investment quickly turned negative.  
This is problem of ex post opportunism is faced by many small private ESCOs in China 
(Vine 2005, Gan 2009), and stems from the nature of both the product and the transaction. 
What is more revealing is that ClearWorld lacked effective means to mitigate this transaction 
cost. First, institutionalized trust was lacking from the beginning. Second, operating from Bei-
jing, ClearWorld never had ties with the regional business and government networks within 
which the customers are embedded. As such, the company lacked the ability – indeed, legiti-
                                                 
13 To enter the association, an ESCO must meet the following qualifications: (i) independent legal body imple-
menting energy conservation projects, (ii) continuous operated for more than 12 months; (iii) registered capital 
not less than one million RMB; (iv) has implemented at least one EPC project, and the accumulated invest-
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macy – to make moral claims on the latter’s local networks to sanction the act of malfeasance. 
On the contrary, moral sanctioning actually went the other way around. As the problem esca-
lated, ClearWorld’s customers persuaded local government authorities to step in on their be-
half, publicly harass and embarrass ClearWorld, and block the company’s access to materials. 
Being disembedded from the local networks, the company was never able to build shared 
norms with the very actors who would have served the role of social police. The incident left 
one of the observers to believe that a ‘Chinese ESCO model’ should be localized and include 
local officials or politicians (Interview 041811).  
Over time, ClearWorld became conservative and now predominantly works with private 
companies who are willing to undergo time-consuming due diligence. But by doing so, the 
company is restricting the scope of its business opportunities and thus ultimately its growth. 
In fact, a company consultant confided that Camco now has a strong preference for foreign 
customers “because of similar culture that makes it easier to trust each other”  (Interview 
051011). Many private ESCOs share a similar experience. For instance, Ecosystem, Canada’s 
largest ESCO, initially identified more than 100 clients, but eventually decided to drop all but 
ten of them. Even after careful background checks on the ten clients, the company constantly 
felt “scared” (Interview 051211). While in North America Ecosystem usually signs 8-10 year-
long contracts, in China they sign 2-3 year-long contracts because “even five years in China is 
too risky as we do not trust the clients” (Interview 051211). Building trust, according to Eco-
systems’ Regional Manager in China, “requires face to face interactions for a long time. We 
start by making simple changes, and after a year we focus on bigger projects” (Interview 
051211). That the market failure in the case of Camco can be explained as a byproduct of lack 
of social relations and networks that offer collective assets like trust, credentials, reputations, 
and sanctioning is further substantiated by cases of more successful private ESCOs that we 
discuss in Case #4.  
4.2  Case 2: NGO-affiliated ESCO 
NGO-affiliated ESCOs, already in possession of an institutional affiliation, are often better 
at overcoming market failures than most private ESCOs. Initial market entry, for instance, is 
often easier for the former, as the sponsoring NGO often facilitates seed money usually in the 
form of a grant from an international agency. This way, the need for capital from Chinese 
banks – and hence the need to build networks and trust with them – is obviated (at least ini-
tially). However, NGO-affiliated ESCOs’ overall growth is also constrained by many of the 
same factors. 
For example, Dalian East Energy Development, Ltd. (DEED) is an ESCO based in the 
northern city of Dalian and specializes in waste heat recovery technology. The ESCO was set 
up in 2006 as a joint venture between Dalian East, Ltd., Dalian East Energy Development 
Holding Company, Ltd., and the Global Environmental Institute (GEI), an NGO based in Bei-
jing. In the case of DEED, GEI and the firm’s manager and CEO served as the main network 
nodes. GEI initially helped establish the business, particularly in acquiring seed capital, which 
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DEED’s clients – all of whom are private cement factories in Zhejiang, Fujian, and Liaoning 
– were found through the social networks of the company’s manager and CEO. Both were 
previously involved in the cement industry; one used to be in a government department regu-
lating the industry and the other used to work in cement factories. Their personal government 
network and industry network proved valuable in completing initial transactions (Interview 
042111). The manager and CEO introduced to DEED clients whom they knew to be trustwor-
thy from their previous work relationships. Clients, on the other hand, made a “leap of faith” 
in DEED because they had dealt with the company’s important personnel in the past and 
found them to be credible.  
Firmly rooted in such relations, DEED was able to rely on trust to maintain business rela-
tionships and did not have to face the most egregious type of problem that many private ES-
COs like ClearWorld have to deal with: opportunism. The general manager of DEED empha-
sized that since it takes more than three years to see any return on initial investments, it is 
critical for the ESCO to establish and maintain an amicable long-term relationship with the 
clients. DEED was able to achieve this mainly by building upon common past experiences 
between the clients and its executives. Disputes and arguments arose between DEED and the 
clients frequently, but the manager and CEO managed to resolve them through direct commu-
nication  and  through  recalling  positive  past  experiences  (Interview  042111).  Likewise,  a 
World Bank report notes the existence of a “guanxi-based system” in China in which “an ES-
CO has a pre-arranged relationship with the client.” When the two parties already have an 
established relationship based on trust, the ESCO does not need to expend resources guarding 
against opportunism (World Bank 2005, p. 23). In the case of DEED, the customers in all 
three projects are paying on time (Interview 042111).  
Nevertheless, DEED’s growth and expansion to other sectors is seriously hampered. This 
is primarily because its two main network resource providers – the manager and CEO of 
DEED and GEI – are limited in their network scope and do not occupy strategic network loca-
tions. For instance, DEED’s manager and CEO might have dense or strong networks within 
the cement industry, but do not possess cross-sectoral networks needed for continued expan-
sion and growth. In other words, the nature of their networks is bi-nodal, stretching only be-
tween themselves and a number of clients within one industry. In fact, even within the cement 
industry, it is doubtful that DEED has dense networks. China accounts for 47% of the world’s 
cement production, including more than 5,000 plants operating in 2005, and it is known that 
an enormous demand for energy efficiency projects exists in the industry (IEA/ OCED 2010, 
Andrews-Speed 2009, p. 1336). That DEED was able to enlist only three projects in six years 
is telling, especially when compared to more successful private ESCOs that we illustrate in 
case 4 below.  
Second, both DEED and GEI are essentially removed from the actual project sites in Zhe-
jiang, Fujian, and Liaoning. The company was not keen on embedding itself in local relations 
that encompass other important actors such as local governments and financial institutions,
14 
further limiting its ability to expand to other sectors even within the three localities. Lastly, 
                                                 
14 This is because GEI receives funding from international donors who are more cautious about interventions or 
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unlike some Chinese NGOs that have an institutional “sponsor” – usually an organization in 
the government – who can act as an authority figure or a guarantor, GEI is an independent 
NGO that does not have such ties. Hence, opportunities to enlist the help of a higher level 
institutional player to mitigate information problems and to “put in a word” for the firm, espe-
cially when seeking new customers in the public sector and SOE sector, are scant.  
In short, lacking “network bridges” (Granovetter 1973, Burt 1992) and disembedded from 
local networks, DEED was unable to build trust with potential customers in other sectors and 
in other regions. Hence, the company (as well as customers and financial institutions) began 
to perceive and fear some of the same problems that many private ESCOs face. As a result, 
even though its technology is portable to other industrial processes, once the opportunities 
were maximized in these three isolated projects, there was no more clientele base for DEED. 
Once the foreign capital dried up, the firm was unable to convince Chinese banks to offer 
loans; nor could it guarantee to the banks that its new customers are going to make payments 
on time. As of late 2010, DEED’s shareholders decided to halt embarking on any new pro-
jects. At the same time, however, DEED’s general manager still insists that “this is a good 
business” and that he sees huge opportunities in the market (Interview 042111). 
4.3  Case 3: Public ESCO 
The newly emerging “public” ESCOs have drastically different experiences in the market, 
as epitomized by Hebei Fakai Scientific Electricity Services Limited Liability Company in 
Hebei Province. Fakai was established by Hebei Province Demand-Side Management and 
Instruction Center (DMS Center). The DMS Center in turn is fully invested by state-owned 
capital  and  directly  established  by  the  provincial  Development  and  Reform  Commission 
(DRC) to promote energy efficiency and demand-side management (DSM) in the province 
(Interview 052011). Hebei DRC strongly support the DMS Center since the province now faces lots of 
pressures to meet provincial energy saving goals since the inclusion of binding provincial energy effi-
ciency targets in China’s 11
th and 12
th Five-Year Plans (Interview 051911; Kostka and Hobbs 2012). 
Also referred to as a “super ESCO” by some (Limaye & Limaye 2011), Fakai is legally a separate, 
independent entity, but its provincial government provenance and DRC’s support are widely known 
(USAID 2009, Limaye & Limaye 2011).  
While Fakai’s establishment met with much fanfare, its ultimate success is by no means 
guaranteed. In fact, most of its projects are in the initial stages, and hence it is premature to 
evaluate the firm’s overall performance. Furthermore, some observers note that Fakai is still 
largely a government entity whose core personnel is made of “a group of young, passionate 
professionals  with  master  degrees  but  not  much  experience  in  the  industry”  (Interview 
051911). They lack the necessary technical expertise to evaluate and monitor ESCO projects, 
to create investment portfolios, or to design sophisticated contracts. An investor of Fakai said: 
“Fakai still has a long ways to go. Its future success will depend on whether it can build up 
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Nevertheless, Fakai’s experiences operating in the market have already been very distinct 
from those ESCOs in Case 1 and Case 2. For instance, whereas approximately 97% of ESCOs 
face financial barriers (EMCA 1997 cited AFD 2008c, p. 8), procuring capital has not been a 
key issue for Fakai as “loans are easy to get from domestic banks if Fakai can pass banks’ 
standard approval procedures” (Interview 052011). By 2010, the total investment was 100 
million RMB, and it is expected that between 2011 and 2013, investments will increase to 1.6 
billion  RMB.  The  required  investment  of  equity  by  2010  was  90  million  RMB  (Climate 
Technology Initiative 2009). In July 2010, Fakai successfully acquired US$8.5 million from 
private financial institutions, with which it signed a contract with the Longhai Steel and Iron 
Company in Hebei to install a heat recovery system and steam-powered turbines that will use 
the facility’s own waste heat to generate electricity (Interview 050811, Interview 052011).  
The provincial DRC’s impact on Fakai’s rapid development is undeniable. One view is to 
stress the size, capacity, and financial resources that come along with a government affiliation 
as  the  main  driver  behind  Fakai’s  development  (USAID  2010,  Limaye  &  Limaye  2011). 
While we do not discount the importance of such firm-level attributes, from the perspective of 
asymmetric information and transaction costs, the affiliation with DRC also provides net-
work-level resources. DRC acts both as a conduit for credible information for both parties to a 
transaction, an authority figure to guarantee Fakai’s credentials, and a social police against 
malfeasance.
15 This is especially important in China because ESCO customers are typically 
public entities such as audit department, and projects that have the most potential for energy 
savings are public projects such as LED street lights (Interview 052011). Public agencies find 
it more comfortable to work with Fakai, especially compared to working with private sector 
counterparts (AFD 2008c p. 9). Among other reasons, it is because public agencies know who 
they are dealing with, namely DRC.  
Similarly, with respect to potential clients, Fakai has an “access to a pipeline and projects 
information through DMS and DRC” (Interview 051811) with which it has created a “strong 
supply and demand network with vendors, customers, and clients in SOEs and heavy indus-
tries”  (Interview  051911).  DRC  knows  and  has  repeatedly  dealt  with  “the  key  decision-
makers in the target enterprises” (USAID 2010, p. 19), especially those in the state sector, and 
thus facilitates a credible “dialog between the financial institutions, [the ESCO], and energy 
users” (USAID 2010, p. 18). Whether valid or not, the client enterprises perceive a minimum 
                                                 
15 Theoretically, collusion between public institutions and public or SOE ESCOs may exist, especially given the 
context of political economy in China. In this case, the former may create the latter or have tendency to work 
with the latter merely to pay a “lip service” to administrative fiat. This problem would be more accentuated at 
the local level, where actors are forced to respond to the central government’s order. We thank Sarah Eaton 
for pointing out this possibility. While we do not discount this possibility, we do not believe it can explain the 
whole picture for two reasons. First, public and SOE ESCOs are a new phenomenon in the last two or three 
years, whereas administrative fiat with respect to energy efficiency gains has been going on for a number of 
years. ESCOs have also been around for a number of years in China. SOEs and public institutions should have 
used such a tactic much earlier, if the primary motive is to create a false accounting system. Second, if collu-
sion is indeed the primary incentive, the quality of public ESCOs should remain very low. There is little rea-
son to provide a high quality service when the primary objective is to create false numbers. Doing so would be 
redundancy. However, all signs indicate that public ESCOs are rapidly improving their capacities and aggres-
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level of quality guarantee. Fakai, on the other hand, even though it never had a working rela-
tionship with a particular enterprise, is led to believe that there is a reduced risk of ex post 
opportunism. As a manager of Fakai noted, “Fakai gains a lot of client information through 
the DMS Center, as it will request information reports from companies in the name of gov-
ernment. Thus, it has a pool of rather comprehensive internal information about potential cli-
ents and projects” (Interview 052011). As a consequence of reduced uncertainty, banks are 
more willing to provide loans.
16 Consequently, Fakai was able to quickly build strategic “alli-
ances and partnerships with existing enterprises” across multiple sectors in Hebei (USAID 
2010, p.17). 
Fakai’s dense and cross-industry, multi-nodal networks in turn worked to further signal its 
social credentials, as new customers began to perceive it to possess rich network resources. 
For instance, ECO-Asia Clean Development and Climate Program – a program under the aus-
pices of US Agency for International Development (USAID) – chose to work with Fakai in 
2009. Fakai’s strategic alliances and partnerships were cited as one of the main reasons why 
ECO-Asia decided to work with the ESCO; the probability of success seemed higher (USAID 
2010, Interview 050811). In other words, potential customers are led to trust that its abundant 
network resources will enable it to “get things done” in the uncertain Chinese ESCO market. 
Public agencies also have a similar perception. When asked about Fakai’s ultimate decision 
maker, an employee responded that “the head of the DMS center makes all of final decisions. 
He is a government official and the top leaders in other government agencies cares a lot about 
the fact that a government official is behind Fakai” (Interview 052011). As customers flocked 
in and Fakai was able to successfully sign a contract with Xingtai Longhai Steel and Iron 
Company, a leading SOE in Hebei, Fakai quickly built reputation within the network, and a 
sort of self-fulfilling prophecy was the result (Interview 050811). 
As we write this article, the newest phenomenon in the Chinese ESCO industry seems to 
be the rise of SOE-affiliated or –owned ESCOs. According to EMCA, the ascent of SOE-
owned ESCOs has been rapid (Interview 051811). China’s largest energy-consuming SOEs 
such as State Grid, Baosteel, Guangdong Nuclear Power Group are increasingly establishing 
their own dedicated ESCOs. Industry experts emphasize that SOE-based ESCOs have “more 
relationships, more clients, and more funds behind them” through networks of their parent 
SOEs (Interview 052011), and that China’s state-owned banks are more likely to trust state-
owned ESCOs (Interview 051011). Many of our interviewees stressed that large clients in 
particular, the majority of whom are also SOEs themselves, sense “chengxin (诚信) on the 
part of state-owned ESCOs” (Interview 052011), loosely translated as sincerity and honesty, 
or keeping one’s word. The main reason is the repeated interactions that the customers have 
had with the parent SOEs. Undergirded by such a sentiment, SOEs “do not need 50-page con-
tracts” because they can work with each other just by signing a memorandum of understand-
ing (Interview 050811).  
                                                 
16 One may be tempted to argue that political favoritism is at work in such a case. While we have no way to 
disapprove such a claim, we contend that this cannot paint the whole picture, as we illustrate in case 4 below. 
In addition, even when banks are still reluctant, Fakai’s clients are usually those with substantial budgeting 
and  procurement  autonomy,  such  as  water/heating/power  utilities,  hospitals,  and  schools  and  universities 
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4.4  Case 4: Embedded Private ESCOs 
We explained above that most private ESCOs in China have difficulties building trust with 
the customer base because they are disembedded from the existing networks that are usually 
regional. That is to say, the main determinant of an ESCO’s success is not its legal status – 
private or public, for example – per se, but rather its social relations and networks. The fol-
lowing two private firms do successfully form and maintain networks and relationships re-
quired in the Chinese ESCO market. However, our research finds them to be an exception to 
the rule, particularly given that most private ESCOs do not have a history of relationships 
with the majority of potential clients who are in the public sector and the SOE sector.
17 
Consider a relatively new private ESCO company (from here on Company A
18) in the city 
of A, whose main service is to improve energy efficiency in commercial malls and hotels. The 
firm’s stellar growth is a stark contrast with case #1 and even case #2. Shortly after success-
fully completing its first project with the local government, the firm received a contract to 
provide energy efficiency services to all of the companies in an industrial park in another 
nearby major city. A representative claimed that “because of the track record, clients are com-
ing to them directly now” (Interview 042111). Financially, the company is now receiving ven-
ture capital funds and has recently signed a contract with a major domestic bank which has 
guaranteed bank loans. Company A is currently preparing for an IPO with which it can further 
expand its financial streams. Moreover, its customer relations have been extremely stable. In 
contrast to the industry average of five to eight years in contract length, the firm usually signs 
contracts that are 20 to 25 years long with its customers. When asked if the company ever 
fears that customers will refuse to pay in the future, the company representatives simply re-
sponded, “people always pay” (Interview 040411).  
Likewise, while the CEO of Baoding Runli Energy-Saving and Environmental Protection 
Co., Ltd. in the city of Baoding (Hebei Province) is also concerned about many of the issues 
that are plaguing the majority of private ESCOs, the company’s ESCO business has grown 
rapidly since it entered the market in 2010. In just one year, Runli signed EPCs with 11 dif-
ferent local companies to implement technologies that recover and recycle residual heat from 
waste gas in industrial boilers. (In contrast, as shown above, DEED signed a total of three 
projects in the span of six years.) It is estimated that in 2010, each project saved about one 
million RMB worth of energy,
19 with Runli taking about 30% of the savings. The local media 
as well as the government has been touting the company’s success as well as the merits of the 
ESCO concept, and all signs indicate that the customers have been satisfied (Baoding Daily 
                                                 
17 Many private enterprises attempt to partner with established institutions. For instance, ESCOs operate in Chi-
na’s construction market are reported to form strategic alliances with producers of technologies (mostly for 
lighting and air conditioners) that adhere to the energy efficiency label awarded by the China Standard Certifi-
cation Center (CSC) (AFD, 2008a, p.8). This strategy to partner with firms that are awarded the energy effi-
ciency label adds credentials to the ESCO. 
18 To protect the human subjects involved in this case, we are using pseudonyms for the individuals, firm, and 
place related to this case. 
19 Along with about 800 tons of standard coal, 19 tons of SO2, 1975 tons of CO2, and over 6 million cubic me-
ters of waste gas for each project, according to Baoding city government Center of Energy Saving Supervi-
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2011). The company to date has not faced the kind of ex post opportunism harrowing many 
fellow private ESCOs in China, nor is it overly concerned with cash flows, especially from 
local financial institutions (Interview 042611).  
What sets these companies apart from many other private ESCOs is not only their success, 
but  also  their  deep-rooted  relations  and  networks.  The  local  networks  brought  a  certain 
amount of credibility and certainty to the outcome of transactions. For Company A, its net-
work  resources  come  primarily  from  its  founder  and  CEO,  who  is  a  bureaucrat-turned-
entrepreneur with an extensive background in the local government. It is known that he has a 
network of “friends” who occupy strategic positions in the government, including the mayor 
(Interview 042111). On the other hand, Runli’s network in Baoding is both at the personal 
and firm level and is cultivated through repeated interactions with the local business and po-
litical community over the years. Established in 1985 as an equipment manufacturer, Runli 
has slowly built expansive working relationships with local enterprises – both private and 
public – over the last 25 years. In addition, Runli is the first and the only ESCO in Baoding 
“officially” recognized by the city DRC.  
The benefits of such embeddedness for firms’ ability to enter the market and to consum-
mate and maintain transactions with customers are manifested in several ways. First, local 
networks improve access to capital, especially from traditional financial institutions. In the 
case of Company A, the initial capital for the first project was procured with the local gov-
ernment’s help. A casual observer may look at this and claim that this is nothing more than 
pure political favoritism – if not corruption – at work. Indeed, we have no way to prove oth-
erwise. However, such a view leaves no room for understanding the role of such connection. 
We argue that a more important theoretical and empirical issue is what that political connec-
tion does – i.e., its function – in the face of imperfect information and uncertainty.
20  
Instead, the real significance of the city government standing behind Company A is analo-
gous to Fakai’s having affiliation with the provincial DRC: transmission of some information 
about Company A’s credibility. Local banks were led to trust Company A because the local 
government officials – with whom the banks have had a long history of relationship – gave a 
vote of confidence. The government officials in turn knew their ex-colleague’s track record, at 
the minimum in his past government capacity. In other words, the founder’s network within 
the government proved to be a sort of an unwritten certification of quality or reputation. That 
the local financial institutions were ultimately moved more by assessment of trustworthiness 
and credibility rather than by administrative fiat or political favoritism is reflected by their 
reluctance to take too much risk. In the first project, the local banks made it clear to company 
                                                 
20 Simply assuming or judging that there is some kind of crony capitalism going on may be premature. Chinese 
banks have become largely profit-oriented market institutions over the last decade, and they are increasingly 
reluctant to provide loans simply because they are “ordered” by some influential government officials without 
knowing the prospects of business ventures. A former director of a national-level high-tech industrial devel-
opment zone confided to us, “You would be foolish to think that banks will hand out loans to a company – or 
to us – just because we [the government] ask them to. That was possible twenty years ago, but not anymore. 
The company’s project has to be feasible and profitability expectable in order to incentivize banks. If you 
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A that the loan is performance-based, and that it must successfully complete the first project 
and deliver the promised energy savings in order to have any chance at procuring future loans 
(Interview  042111).  In  the  case  of  Runli,  the  tight  local  business  community  channeled 
enough information about the actors involved. The local banks had repeated interactions not 
only with Runli, but also with most of its customers who have also been firmly rooted in the 
region for a long time. Expectation of positive outcomes based on the knowledge of their 
track records meant the banks were less concerned about risk than they otherwise might have 
been.  
Willingness on the part of customers (as well as the companies themselves) to enter a con-
tract is enhanced by a similar process. Again, for Company A, the network effect is similar to 
that of Fakai in case #3 above, as most of its customers are public institutions. As for Runli, it 
is clear that its customers took a “leap of faith” in signing contracts with the ESCO. In Baod-
ing, most businesses are unaware of EPC and do not understand ESCO services or products 
(Interview 042811). Without understanding the implications of the contracts, Runli’s custom-
ers decided to work with Runli simply because they had worked with the company before and 
found it to be trustworthy (Interview 042611).  
Lastly, malfeasance is mitigated through a social sanctioning feature of these interlocking 
networks. In the case of Runli and its customers, reputation not only in the business sphere 
but also in the social sphere seems to put a considerable constraint on their behavior. For one, 
rooted in the local economy, future business opportunities are dependent on whether or not 
one can maintain one’s reputation. Thus, when transacting, actors tend to deliver and refrain 
from flouting their contract. Second, enterprise leaders and representatives frequently social-
ize and dine with each other, almost always at one or two upscale venues in the city. Thus, if a 
client reneges on a contract, the news spreads rapidly to other business partners by word of 
mouth. Sometimes, certain consequences such as ostracism and humiliation are irreversible. It 
is telling that even though the CEO of Runli is acutely aware of and feels vulnerable because 
of the lack of contract  enforcement (Interview  042611), the CEO is still willing to make 
transactions with customers.  
For Company A, compared to its own reputation, the more important was the reputation of 
its supporter, i.e., the local government (or in particular, the mayor), especially in the begin-
ning stage when Company A had yet to build its own network in the region. If the founder 
had hopes of maintaining his social relations with his colleagues in the local government, he 
had to make sure that the government does not “lose face” in the public because of the com-
pany’s performance. That is to say, even if corruption exists and even if the company ulti-
mately  charges exorbitantly high prices for its products and services, it nonetheless faces 
enormous pressure to deliver on its promises. Thus, there is a minimum level of quality guar-
anteed. As for the customers, their relationship with the city government itself deters them 
from taking advantage of the company before the terms of the contract expire. The head of the 
transportation bureau, for example, does not want to get reprimanded by the mayor in a gov-
ernment meeting. A lower level of (perceived) malfeasance in turn makes the parties more 
willing to trust each other and conduct business transactions. Without such a level of guaran-
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042111). Anticipating less malfeasance, financial institutions are also more inclined to invest 
in projects.  
5  Discussion 
The above  examples illustrate that Chinese ESCOs, the majority of  whom are private, 
struggle to create trust between themselves and potential customers. We find that most private 
ESCOs are unable to create networks with the potential customer base through which trust 
can naturally build up. Sometimes, they are not even interested in embedding themselves in 
local networks (Interview 042511). We believe this is a problem—or “barrier”—much more 
serious and fundamental than the multitude of barriers frequently cited by other analysts and 
authors.  
First, for maximum energy efficiency gains and thus for realizing maximum growth poten-
tial, major clients of ESCOs are government agencies, public institutions, and heavy indus-
tries (which are usually SOEs). Making these state actors trust in the quality of their product 
and service is a major challenge for private ESCOs. Chinese companies generally do not trust 
outside companies like ESCOs. This is particularly the case if energy-saving projects require 
modifying a company's process line, which imposes high market and technical risks and can 
be highly disruptive to business operations. As a consequence, only large ESCOs that have 
gained a strong reputation in the field and gained a customer's 'trust' can provide for this kind 
of contract. Otherwise, companies prefer to take care of retrofits themselves and outsource 
only those projects that do not modify fundamental production processes, such as lighting and 
electric load management (AFD 2008a, p. 9; Interview 0510 11).  
Even  without  considering  other  political  and  institutional  factors  –  such  as  well-
documented discrimination against the private sector in the banking sector (Tsai 2002, Huang 
2003) or government preference for creating “national champions” out of big SOEs (Nolan 
2001) – these private ESCOs simply do not have a history of working relationships with their 
potential customers. Second, many of the potential projects and transactions are localized. 
Trust becomes more important, when the main potential customers are local government insti-
tutions and local SOEs. Nonetheless, a bulk of ESCOs are conglomerated in major metropoli-
tan areas like Beijing and Shanghai. Away from the actual work site, most of these ESCOs are 
disembedded from the local networks, i.e., the main source of trust building. The local cus-
tomers feel that it is difficult to build a long-term working relationship with a consultant a 
thousand miles away.  
Public ESCOs and SOE-affiliated ESCOs operate quite differently. Again, collusion and 
even crony capitalism may exist, but they fail to account for the whole story. With a long es-
tablished working relationship, when an SOE or public institution establishes a new subsidi-
ary company as an ESCO, the latter’s potential customers and financiers have easier time 
trusting the quality of work it is going to deliver, because what they are trusting is not neces-
sary the ESCO, but the institution standing behind it. It is well-known – and, in fact, widely 
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judges is not necessarily feasibility of the project itself, but rather the client’s trustworthiness 
(Gan 2009). In addition, most of the more successful public ESCOs are deeply rooted in their 
respective localities. In other words, they have been embedded in local commercial, social, 
and political networks for a long time.  
It is important to note that we are not claiming that only public ESCOs or SOE-affiliated 
ESCOs have a room to grow in China. Rather, this paper stresses the importance of socially 
embedded  networks  through  which  trust  between  transacting  parties  is  created  and  main-
tained, which in turn helps the parties to overcome the inherent transaction cost problem and 
market failure in the Chinese ESCO industry. Nothing in this analysis or theoretical frame-
work precludes private firm’s ability to do so. Our empirical work in case #4 clearly illus-
trates this. In our research, however, we have not encountered many private companies like 
Runli and Company A.  
Even from a purely economic perspective, a system of relational governance provides im-
petus for ESCOs’ growth in several ways. First, even if customers and financial actors do not 
completely understand the long-term consequences or viability of an ESCO project, they are 
less reluctant to enter a long-term contract. Second, being embedded in local networks, both 
the customer and seller are perceived as less likely to renege on contract. Lastly, even if the 
specific details of the contract do not materialize exactly as planned, the engaged parties know 
– indeed trust – that they will be able to rework the details later on. Such flexibility takes on 
an added importance when contracts signed between the parties are usually only two pages 
long. Therefore, ex ante, they are more likely to enter transaction.  
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6  Conclusion 
China has started numerous efforts to turn towards a more energy efficient economy. Bei-
jing has predominantly used command and control mechanism or administrative fiat to curb 
energy consumption, by, for instance, planting different mandatory targets into the national 
11
th and 12
th Five Year Plans. At the same time, the central government has started to promote 
market-based approaches by, for instance, releasing a series of legislation and policies to im-
prove the development of China’s energy saving service industry. However, market-based 
approaches have their limitations in China. Studying the development of China’s ESCO in-
dustry, this paper argues that with sophisticated market institutions still evolving in China, the 
formation of trustworthy relationships between ESCOs and potential customers is critical.  
We presented four specific cases to illustrate that local business, social, and political net-
works are key factors determining the success or failure of an ESCO in the Chinese market. 
The case studies of ClearWorld and DEED show that it remains challenging for the majority 
of ESCOs – which typically are small and privately owned – to form and maintain lasting 
business relationships with their potential customer base, which predominantly consists of 
local public institutions and SOEs. Furthermore, a typical ESCO is based in large cities, far 
away from the actual project site, which further limits its ability to embed itself in local net-
works, the main source of trust building. Public ESCOs on the other hand operate quite dif-
ferently, as epitomized by the Fakai case study. The company’s dense and multi-nodal net-
works, created mainly through its ties with the Hebei provincial government, made it easier 
for  potential  customers  and  financial  institutions  to  trust the  company.  In  rarer  instances, 
when private ESCOs build sufficient network resources, they can also grow substantially. 
Company A and Runli illustrate some of the possible network creation strategies.  
The empirical findings of this paper suggest that, in the absence of advanced market insti-
tutions, the Chinese ESCO market is necessarily regulated by a system of relational govern-
ance. Recognizing this reality and refraining from ‘monocropping’ the market governance 
model practiced in the US or European ESCO markets may be the biggest obstacle for the 





Frankfurt School of Finance & Management 
Working Paper No. 168 
 
References 
Agence Francaise de Developpement, 2008a. Development of Energy Service Companies  
in China. Paris: Agence Francaise de Developpement. 
Agence Francaise de Developpement, 2008b. Market Characteristics of Energy Service Com-
panies in China. Paris: Agence Francaise de Developpement. 
Agence  Francaise  de  Developpement,  2008c.  Potentials  and  Barriers  for  Development  in 
China. Paris: Agence Francaise de Developpement. 
Akerlof, G.A., 1970. The Market for ‘Lemons’: Quality Uncertainty and the Market  
Mechanism. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84 (3), 488-500. 
Andrews-Speed, P., 2009. China’s Ongoing Energy Efficiency Drive: Origins, Progress and 
Prospects. Energy Policy, 37, 1331-1344.  
Axelrod, R., 1984. The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books. 
Baoding Daily, 2011. A Piece of Paper Solves Enterprises Energy-Savings Issues. Authored 
by Liu, F. 6 April, p. B1 (in Chinese). 
Bourdieu, P., 1985. The Forms of Capital. In: J.G. Richardson, eds. Handbook of Theory and 
Research for the Sociology of Education. New York: Greenwood, 241-258. 
Burt, R.S., 1992. Structural Holes: The Social Structure of Competition. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press. 
Chen K. & Xu Z, 2010. Energy Performance Contracting in China [online]. King &Wood 
PRC Lawyers.  
Available from: http://www.kingandwood.com/article.aspx?id=Energy-Performance-
Contracting-in-China&language=en [Accessed 13 April 2011]. 
Climate Technology Initiative, 2009. Available from: 
http://www.climatetech.net/news/WhatsNew.cfm?Page=1&NewsID=56389 [Accessed 1 
June 2011]. 
Coase, R.H., 1937. The Nature of the Firm. Economica, 4 (16), 386-405. 
Coleman, J.S., 1988. Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital, The American  
Journal of Sociology, 94 (Supplement), S95-S120. 
Coleman,  J.S.,  1990.  Foundations  of  Social  Theory.  Cambridge,  MA:  Harvard  University 
Press. 
Demsetz, H., 1967. Toward a Theory of Property Rights. The American Economic  
Review,  57  (2),  Papers  and  Proceedings  of  the  Seventy-ninth  Annual  Meeting  of  the 
American Economic Association, 347-359. 
Delio, E.A., Lall, S. & Singh, C., 2009. Powering Up: The Investment Potential of Energy 
Service  Companies  in  India  [online].  World  Resources  Institute.  Available  from: 
http://www.wri.org/publication/powering-up [Accessed 25 April 2011]. 
Dwyer, F.R., Schurr, P.H. & Oh, S., 1987. Developing Buyer-Seller Relationships. The  
Journal of Marketing, 51 (2), 11-27. 
Energy  Management  Companies  Association  (EMCA),  2011.  “Twelfth  Five  Year  Plan” 
China’s Energy Management Companies Industry Report. Beijing: EMCA [in Chinese]. 
Financial  Times  China  Confidential.  2010.  A  new  big  theme:  Energy  Savings.  Financial 
Times China Confidential, 22 April. 
Finley, M., 1973. The Ancient Economy. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. 
Gan, D., 2009. Energy service companies to improve energy efficiency in China: barriers and 





Frankfurt School of Finance & Management 
Working Paper No. 168  27 
 
Granovetter, M., 1973. The Strength of Weak Ties. American Journal of Sociology, 78,  
1360-80. 
Granovetter, M., 1985. Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of  
Embeddedness. American Journal of Sociology, 91, 481-510. 
Hasnie, Sohail, 2009. ESCOs in the Philippines, Presentation at the Workshop on ESCOs and 
Energy Efficiency Projects, Asian Development Bank. 
Huang, Y., 2003. Selling China: Foreign Direct Investment During the Reform Era. Cam-
bridge University Press. 
International Energy Agency / Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/,  
2010. World Energy Outlook 2010. Paris: IEA. 
Kaneko, I. & Imai, K., 1987. A Network View of the Firm. Paper presented at 1
st Hitotsub-
ashi-Stanford Conference, 29 March-1 April 1987. 
Kostka, G. & Hobbs, W., 2012. Local Energy Efficiency Policy Implementation in China: 
Bridging the Gap between National Priorities and Local Interests, The China Quarterly, 
forthcoming. 
Li, J. & Colombier, M., 2009. Managing carbon emissions in China through building energy 
efficiency. Journal of Environmental Management, 90, 2436-2447.  
Limaye,  D.R.  &  Limaye,  E.S.,  2010.  Scaling  up  energy  efficiency:  the  case  for  a  Super 
ESCO. Energy Efficiency, 4, 133-144.  
Lin, N., 1999. Building a Network Theory of Social Capital. Connections, 22 (1), 28-51. 
Loury, G.C., 1977. A Dynamic Theory of Racial Income Differences. In: P.A. Wallace and 
A.M. LaMond eds. Women, Minorities, and Employment Discrimination. Lexington, MA: 
Lexington Books, 153-186.  
Macneil, I.R., 1980. The New Social Contract: An Inquiry into Modern Contractual  
Relations. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
Mayer, R.C., Davis, J.H., & Schoorman F.D., 1995. An Integrative Model of  
Organizational Trust. The Academy of Management Review, 20 (3), 709-734. 
Meidan, M., Andrews-Speed, P. & Ma, X., 2009. Shaping China's energy policy: actors and 
processes. Journal of Contemporary China, 18, 591-616. 
National Development and Reform Commission, August 2010. Announcement of ESCOs 
which put on records (the first batch) No. 22, Beijing: National Development and Reform 
Commission. Available from: 
http://www.ndrc.gov.cn/zcfb/zcfbgg/2011gg/t20110314_399354.htm [Accessed 13 April 
2011]. 
National  Development  and  Reform  Commission,  March  2011.  Announcement  of  ESCOs 
which put on records (the second batch) No. 3, Beijing: National Development and Re-
form Commission, Available from: 
 http://www.sdpc.gov.cn/zcfb/zcfbgg/2010gg/t20100907369860.htm [Accessed 13 April 
2011]. 
Nolan, P., 2001. China and the Global Economy: National Champions, Industrial Policy, and 
the Big Business Revolution. Basingstoke: Palgrave. 
North, D., 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge 
University Press. 
Palay, T.M., 1984. Comparative Institutional Economics: The Governance of Rail  





Frankfurt School of Finance & Management 
Working Paper No. 168 
 
Poppo, L. & Zenger, T., 2002. Do Formal Contracts and Relational Governance Function as 
Substitutes or Complements? Strategic Management Journal, 23 (8), 707-725. 
Portes, A. 1998. Social Capital: Its Origins and Applications in Modern Sociology. Annual 
Review of Sociology, 24, 1-24. 
Powell, W.W., 1990. Neither Market Nor Hierarchy: Network Forms of Organization. Re-
search in Organizational Behavior, 12, 295-336. 
Price, L., Wang, X. & Yun, J., 2010. The Challenge of Reducing Energy-Consumption of the 
Top-1000 Largest Industrial Enterprises in China. Energy Policy, 38 (11), 6485-6498.  
Putnam, R., 1993. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton, 
N.J. : Princeton University Press. 
Rothschild, M. and Stiglitz, J., 1976. Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An  
Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
90 (4), 629-649. 
Rousseau, D.M., Sitkin, S., Burt, R. & Camerer, C., 1998. Not So Different After All: A 
Cross-Discipline View of Trust. Academy of Management Review, 23 (3), 393-404. 
Saxton, T., 1997. The Effects of Partner and Relationship Characteristics on Alliance  
Outcomes. The Academy of Management Journal, 40 (2), Special Research Forum on Al-
liances and Networks, 443-461. 
Singh, J., Limaye, D., Henderson, B., & Shi, X., 2009. Public procurement of energy effi-
ciency services: Lessons from International experience. Washington, D.C.: The World 
Bank. 
State Council Document, 2010. No. 25 State Opinions of Accelerated Implementation of En-
ergy Performance Contracting and Promotion of Development of Energy Saving Service 
Industry. Beijing: General Office of the State Council. 
Tsai, K., 2002. Back-Alley Banking: Private Entrepreneurs in China, Ithaca: Cornell Univer-
sity Press.  
United States Agency  for  International Development, 2007. China Country Report: From 
Ideas to Action: Clean Energy Solutions for Asia to Address Climate Change. Bangkok: 
USAID.  
United States Agency for International Development, 2009. Training Workshop Implementing 
and  Financing  Energy  Efficient  Power  Plants  Projects  in  Heibei  Province.  Bangkok: 
USAID.  
United States Agency for International Development, 2010. Development of a Super ESCO to 
Implement a 600 MW Energy Efficiency Power Plant. Bangkok: USAID.  
Ürge-Vorsatz, D., Köppel, S., Liang, C., Kiss, B., Nair, G., & Celikyilmaz, G., 2007. An As-
sessment of Energy Service Companies (ESCOs) Worldwide. World Energy Council.  
Vine, E., 2005. An international survey of the energy service company (ESCO) 
Industry. Energy Policy, 33, 691-704. 
Wang, G., Wang Y., & Zhao, T., 2008. Analysis of interactions among the barriers to energy 
saving in China. Energy Policy, 36, 1879-1889.  
Wank, D.L., 2001. Commodifying Communism: Business, Trust, and Politics in a  
Chinese City. Cambridge University Press. 
Williamson, O.E., 1975. Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications.  
New York: Free Press. 





Frankfurt School of Finance & Management 
Working Paper No. 168  29 
 
World Bank, 2005. Energy Efficiency Portfolio Review and Practitioners’ Handbook,  
Washington, DC: World Bank. 
World Bank, 2008. The Development of China’s ESCO Industry, 2004-2007. Unpublished. 
World Bank & Australian Government Overseas Aid Program. 2010. Winds of Change:  
East Asia’s Sustainable Energy Future. Washington: The World Bank.  
World Bank, 2010. Accessing the Impact of IFC’s China Utility-Based Energy Efficiency  
Finance Program. Washington: The World Bank.  
Zaheer, A. & Venkatraman, N., 1995. Relational Governance as an Interorganizational Strat-
egy: An Empirical Test of the Role of Trust in Economic Exchange. Strategic Manage-
ment Journal, 16 (5), 373-392. 
Zaheer, A., McEvily, B. & Perrone, V., 1998. Does Trust Matter? Exploring the Effects of 
Interorganizational and Interpersonal Trust on Performance. Organization Science, 9 (2), 
141-159. 
Zhou, K.Z., Poppo, L. & Yang, Z., 2008. Relational Ties or Customized Contracts?: An Ex-
amination of Alternative Governance Choices in China. Journal of International Business 
Studies, 39, 526-534. 
Zhou, N., Levine, M. & Price, L., 2010. Overview of Current Energy Efficiency Policies in 
China. Energy Policy, 38 (11), 6439-6452. 





Frankfurt School of Finance & Management 
Working Paper No. 168 
 
FRANKFURT SCHOOL / HFB – WORKING PAPER SERIES    
No.  Author/Title  Year 
167  Andriani, Pierpaolo / Herrmann-Pillath, Carsten 
Performing Comparative Advantage: The Case of the Global Coffee Business  2011 
166.  Klein, Michael / Mayer, Colin 
Mobile Banking and Financial Inclusion: The Regulatory Lessons  2011 
165.  Cremers, Heinz / Hewicker, Harald 
Modellierung von Zinsstrukturkurven  2011 
164.  Roßbach, Peter / Karlow, Denis 
The Stability of Traditional Measures of Index Tracking Quality  2011 
163.  Libman, Alexander / Herrmann-Pillath, Carsten / Yarav, Gaudav 
Are Human Rights and Economic Well-Being Substitutes? Evidence from Migration Patterns across the Indian States  2011 
162.  Herrmann-Pillath, Carsten / Andriani, Pierpaolo 
Transactional Innovation and the De-commoditization of the Brazilian Coffee Trade  2011 
161.  Christian Büchler, Marius Buxkaemper, Christoph Schalast, Gregor Wedell 
Incentivierung des Managements bei Unternehmenskäufen/Buy-Outs mit Private Equity Investoren  
– eine empirische Untersuchung – 
2011 
160.  Herrmann-Pillath, Carsten 
Revisiting the Gaia Hypothesis: Maximum Entropy, Kauffman´s “Fourth Law” and Physiosemeiosis  2011 
159.  Herrmann-Pillath, Carsten 
A ‘Third Culture’ in Economics? An Essay on Smith, Confucius and the Rise of China  2011 
158.  Boeing. Philipp / Sandner, Philipp 
The Innovative Performance of China’s National Innovation System  2011 
157.  Herrmann-Pillath, Carsten 
Institutions, Distributed Cognition and Agency: Rule-following as Performative Action  2011 
156.  Wagner, Charlotte 
From Boom to Bust: How different has microfinance been from traditional banking?  2010 
155.  Libman Alexander / Vinokurov, Evgeny  
Is it really different? Patterns of Regionalisation in the Post-Soviet Central Asia  2010 
154.  Libman, Alexander  
Subnational Resource Curse: Do Economic or Political Institutions Matter?   2010 
153.  Herrmann-Pillath, Carsten 
Meaning and Function in the Theory of Consumer Choice: Dual Selves in Evolving Networks  2010 
152.  Kostka, Genia / Hobbs, William 
Embedded Interests and the Managerial Local State: Methanol Fuel-Switching in China  2010 
151.  Kostka, Genia / Hobbs, William 
Energy Efficiency in China: The Local Bundling of Interests and Policies  2010 
150.  Umber, Marc P. / Grote, Michael H. / Frey, Rainer 
Europe Integrates Less Than You Think. Evidence from the Market for Corporate Control in Europe and the US  2010 
149.  Vogel, Ursula / Winkler, Adalbert 
Foreign banks and financial stability in emerging markets: evidence from the global financial crisis  2010 
148.  Libman, Alexander 
Words or Deeds – What Matters? Experience of Decentralization in Russian Security Agencies  2010 
147.  Kostka, Genia / Zhou, Jianghua 
Chinese firms entering China's low-income market: Gaining competitive advantage by partnering governments  2010 
146.  Herrmann-Pillath, Carsten  
Rethinking Evolution, Entropy and Economics: A triadic conceptual framework for the Maximum Entropy Principle as 
applied to the growth of knowledge 
2010 
145.  Heidorn, Thomas / Kahlert, Dennis 
Implied Correlations of iTraxx Tranches during the Financial Crisis 
 
2010 
144  Fritz-Morgenthal, Sebastian G. / Hach, Sebastian T. / Schalast, Christoph 
M&A im Bereich Erneuerbarer Energien 
 
2010 
143.  Birkmeyer, Jörg / Heidorn, Thomas / Rogalski, André 
Determinanten von Banken-Spreads während der Finanzmarktkrise 
 
2010 Energy Service Companies in China: The Role of Social Networks and Trust 
 
 
Frankfurt School of Finance & Management 
Working Paper No. 168   31 
 
142.  Bannier, Christina E. / Metz, Sabrina 
Are SMEs large firms en miniature? Evidence from a growth analysis 
 
2010 
141.  Heidorn, Thomas / Kaiser, Dieter G. / Voinea, André 
The Value-Added of Investable Hedge Fund Indices 
 
2010 
140.  Herrmann-Pillath, Carsten 
The Evolutionary Approach to Entropy: Reconciling Georgescu-Roegen’s Natural Philosophy with the Maximum 
Entropy Framework 
2010 
139.  Heidorn, Thomas / Löw, Christian / Winker, Michael 
Funktionsweise und Replikationstil europäischer Exchange Traded Funds auf Aktienindices 
 
2010 
138.  Libman, Alexander 
Constitutions, Regulations, and Taxes: Contradictions of Different Aspects of Decentralization 
 
2010 
137.  Herrmann-Pillath, Carsten / Libman, Alexander / Yu, Xiaofan 
State and market integration in China: A spatial econometrics approach to ‘local protectionism’ 
 
2010 
136.  Lang, Michael / Cremers, Heinz / Hentze, Rainald 
Ratingmodell zur Quantifizierung des Ausfallrisikos von LBO-Finanzierungen 
 
2010 
135.  Bannier, Christina / Feess, Eberhard 
When high-powered incentive contracts reduce performance: Choking under pressure as a screening device 
 
2010 
134.  Herrmann-Pillath, Carsten  
Entropy, Function and Evolution: Naturalizing Peircian Semiosis 
 
2010 
133.   Bannier, Christina E. / Behr, Patrick / Güttler, Andre  
Rating opaque borrowers: why are unsolicited ratings lower? 
 
2009 
132.  Herrmann-Pillath, Carsten 




131.  Schäffler, Christian / Schmaltz, Christian 
Market Liquidity: An Introduction for Practitioners 
 
2009 
130.  Herrmann-Pillath, Carsten 
Dimensionen des Wissens: Ein kognitiv-evolutionärer Ansatz auf der Grundlage von F.A. von Hayeks Theorie der 
„Sensory Order“ 
2009 
129.  Hankir, Yassin / Rauch, Christian / Umber, Marc 
It’s the Market Power, Stupid! – Stock Return Patterns in International Bank M&A 
 
2009 
128.  Herrmann-Pillath, Carsten 
Outline of a Darwinian Theory of Money 
 
2009 
127.  Cremers, Heinz / Walzner, Jens 
Modellierung des Kreditrisikos im Portfoliofall 
 
2009 
126.  Cremers, Heinz / Walzner, Jens 
Modellierung des Kreditrisikos im Einwertpapierfall 
 
2009 
125.  Heidorn, Thomas / Schmaltz, Christian 
Interne Transferpreise für Liquidität 
 
2009 
124.  Bannier, Christina E. / Hirsch, Christian 
The economic function of credit rating agencies - What does the watchlist tell us?  
 
2009 
123.  Herrmann-Pillath, Carsten 
A Neurolinguistic Approach to Performativity in Economics  
 
2009 
122.  Winkler, Adalbert / Vogel, Ursula 




121.  Heidorn, Thomas / Rupprecht, Stephan 
Einführung in das Kapitalstrukturmanagement bei Banken 
 
2009 
120.  Rossbach, Peter 
Die Rolle des Internets als Informationsbeschaffungsmedium in Banken 
 
2009 
119.  Herrmann-Pillath, Carsten 
Diversity Management und diversi-tätsbasiertes Controlling: Von der „Diversity Scorecard“ zur „Open Balanced 
Scorecard 
2009 
118.  Hölscher, Luise / Clasen, Sven  
Erfolgsfaktoren von Private Equity Fonds 
 
2009 
117.  Bannier, Christina E. 
Is there a hold-up benefit in heterogeneous multiple bank financing? 
 





Frankfurt School of Finance & Management 
Working Paper No. 168 
 
116.  Roßbach, Peter / Gießamer, Dirk  
Ein eLearning-System zur Unterstützung der Wissensvermittlung von Web-Entwicklern in Sicherheitsthemen 
 
2009 
115.  Herrmann-Pillath, Carsten 
Kulturelle Hybridisierung und Wirtschaftstransformation in China  
 
2009 
114.  Schalast, Christoph: 
Staatsfonds – „neue“ Akteure an den Finanzmärkten? 
 
2009 
113.  Schalast, Christoph / Alram, Johannes 
Konstruktion einer Anleihe mit hypothekarischer Besicherung 
 
2009 
112.  Schalast, Christoph / Bolder, Markus / Radünz, Claus / Siepmann, Stephanie / Weber, Thorsten 
Transaktionen und Servicing in der Finanzkrise: Berichte und Referate des Frankfurt School NPL Forums 2008 
 
2009 
111.  Werner, Karl / Moormann, Jürgen 
Efficiency and Profitability of European Banks – How Important Is Operational Efficiency? 
 
2009 
110.  Herrmann-Pillath, Carsten 
Moralische Gefühle als Grundlage einer wohlstandschaffenden Wettbewerbsordnung:  
Ein neuer Ansatz zur erforschung von Sozialkapital und seine Anwendung auf China 
2009 
109.  Heidorn, Thomas / Kaiser, Dieter G. / Roder, Christoph  
Empirische Analyse der Drawdowns von Dach-Hedgefonds 
 
2009 
108.  Herrmann-Pillath, Carsten 
Neuroeconomics, Naturalism and Language 
 
2008 
107.  Schalast, Christoph / Benita, Barten 
Private Equity und Familienunternehmen – eine Untersuchung unter besonderer Berücksichtigung deutscher  
Maschinen- und Anlagenbauunternehmen  
 
2008 
106.  Bannier, Christina E. / Grote, Michael H. 
Equity Gap? – Which Equity Gap? On the Financing Structure of Germany’s Mittelstand 
 
2008 
105.  Herrmann-Pillath, Carsten 
The Naturalistic Turn in Economics: Implications for the Theory of Finance  
 
2008 
104.  Schalast, Christoph (Hrgs.) / Schanz, Kay-Michael / Scholl, Wolfgang  
Aktionärsschutz in der AG falsch verstanden? Die Leica-Entscheidung des LG Frankfurt am Main 
 
2008 
103.  Bannier, Christina E./ Müsch, Stefan  
Die Auswirkungen der Subprime-Krise auf den deutschen LBO-Markt für Small- und MidCaps 
 
2008 
102.  Cremers, Heinz / Vetter, Michael 
Das IRB-Modell des Kreditrisikos im Vergleich zum Modell einer logarithmisch normalverteilten Verlustfunktion 
 
2008 
101.  Heidorn, Thomas / Pleißner, Mathias 
Determinanten Europäischer CMBS Spreads. Ein empirisches Modell zur Bestimmung der Risikoaufschläge von 




100.  Schalast, Christoph (Hrsg.) / Schanz, Kay-Michael  
Schaeffler KG/Continental AG im Lichte der CSX Corp.-Entscheidung des US District Court for the Southern District 




99.  Hölscher, Luise / Haug, Michael / Schweinberger, Andreas 
Analyse von Steueramnestiedaten 
 
2008 
98.  Heimer, Thomas / Arend, Sebastian 
The Genesis of the Black-Scholes Option Pricing Formula 
 
2008 
97.  Heimer, Thomas / Hölscher, Luise / Werner, Matthias Ralf 
Access to Finance and Venture Capital for Industrial SMEs 
 
2008 
96.  Böttger, Marc / Guthoff, Anja / Heidorn, Thomas 
Loss Given Default Modelle zur Schätzung von Recovery Rates 
 
2008 
95.  Almer, Thomas / Heidorn, Thomas / Schmaltz, Christian 
The Dynamics of Short- and Long-Term CDS-spreads of Banks 
 
2008 
94.  Barthel, Erich / Wollersheim, Jutta 





93.  Heidorn, Thomas / Kunze, Wolfgang / Schmaltz, Christian 
Liquiditätsmodellierung von Kreditzusagen (Term Facilities and Revolver) 
 
2008 
92.  Burger, Andreas 
Produktivität und Effizienz in Banken – Terminologie, Methoden und Status quo 
 
2008 Energy Service Companies in China: The Role of Social Networks and Trust 
 
 
Frankfurt School of Finance & Management 
Working Paper No. 168   33 
 
91.  Löchel, Horst / Pecher, Florian 
The Strategic Value of Investments in Chinese Banks by Foreign Financial Insitutions 
 
2008 
90.  Schalast, Christoph / Morgenschweis, Bernd / Sprengetter, Hans Otto / Ockens, Klaas / Stachuletz, Rainer /  
Safran, Robert  






89.  Schalast, Christoph / Stralkowski, Ingo 
10 Jahre deutsche Buyouts 
 
2008 
88.  Bannier, Christina E./ Hirsch, Christian 
The Economics of Rating Watchlists: Evidence from Rating Changes 
 
2007 
87.  Demidova-Menzel, Nadeshda / Heidorn, Thomas 
Gold in the Investment Portfolio 
 
2007 
86.  Hölscher, Luise / Rosenthal, Johannes 
Leistungsmessung der Internen Revision 
 
2007 
85.  Bannier, Christina / Hänsel, Dennis 
Determinants of banks' engagement in loan securitization 
 
2007 
84.  Bannier, Christina 
“Smoothing“ versus “Timeliness“ - Wann sind stabile Ratings optimal und welche Anforderungen sind an optimale 
Berichtsregeln zu stellen? 
 
2007 
83.  Bannier, Christina E. 
Heterogeneous Multiple Bank Financing: Does it Reduce Inefficient Credit-Renegotiation Incidences? 
 
2007 
82.  Cremers, Heinz / Löhr, Andreas 
Deskription und Bewertung strukturierter Produkte unter besonderer Berücksichtigung verschiedener Marktszenarien 
 
2007 
81.  Demidova-Menzel, Nadeshda / Heidorn, Thomas 
Commodities in Asset Management 
 
2007 
80.  Cremers, Heinz / Walzner, Jens 
Risikosteuerung mit Kreditderivaten unter besonderer Berücksichtigung von Credit Default Swaps 
 
2007 
79.  Cremers, Heinz / Traughber, Patrick 





78.  Gerdesmeier, Dieter / Roffia, Barbara 
Monetary Analysis: A VAR Perspective 
 
2007 
77.  Heidorn, Thomas / Kaiser, Dieter G. / Muschiol, Andrea 
Portfoliooptimierung mit Hedgefonds unter Berücksichtigung höherer Momente der Verteilung 
 
2007 
76.  Jobe, Clemens J. / Ockens, Klaas / Safran, Robert / Schalast, Christoph 
Work-Out und Servicing von notleidenden Krediten – Berichte und Referate des HfB-NPL Servicing Forums 2006 
 
2006 
75.  Abrar, Kamyar / Schalast, Christoph 
Fusionskontrolle in dynamischen Netzsektoren am Beispiel des Breitbandkabelsektors 
 
2006 
74.  Schalast, Christoph / Schanz, Kay-Michael 
Wertpapierprospekte: Markteinführungspublizität nach EU-Prospektverordnung und Wertpapierprospektgesetz 2005 
 
2006 
73.  Dickler, Robert A. / Schalast, Christoph 
Distressed Debt in Germany: What´s Next? Possible Innovative Exit Strategies 
 
2006 
72.  Belke, Ansgar / Polleit, Thorsten  
How the ECB and the US Fed set interest rates 
 
2006 
71.  Heidorn, Thomas / Hoppe, Christian / Kaiser, Dieter G.  
Heterogenität von Hedgefondsindizes 
 
2006 
70.  Baumann, Stefan / Löchel, Horst  
The Endogeneity Approach of the Theory of Optimum Currency Areas - What does it mean for ASEAN + 3? 
 
2006 




68.  Heidorn, Thomas / Hoppe, Christian / Kaiser, Dieter G.  
Möglichkeiten der Strukturierung von Hedgefondsportfolios 
 
2005 
67.  Belke, Ansgar / Polleit, Thorsten 
(How) Do Stock Market Returns React to Monetary Policy ? An ARDL Cointegration Analysis for Germany  
 
2005 
66.  Daynes, Christian / Schalast, Christoph  
Aktuelle Rechtsfragen des Bank- und Kapitalmarktsrechts II: Distressed Debt - Investing in Deutschland  
 





Frankfurt School of Finance & Management 
Working Paper No. 168 
 
65.  Gerdesmeier, Dieter / Polleit, Thorsten 
Measures of excess liquidity 
 
2005 
64.  Becker, Gernot M. / Harding, Perham / Hölscher, Luise 
Financing the Embedded Value of Life Insurance Portfolios  
 
2005 
63.  Schalast, Christoph 
Modernisierung der Wasserwirtschaft im Spannungsfeld von Umweltschutz und Wettbewerb – Braucht Deutschland 
eine Rechtsgrundlage für die Vergabe von Wasserversorgungskonzessionen? – 
 
2005 
62.  Bayer, Marcus / Cremers, Heinz / Kluß, Norbert 
Wertsicherungsstrategien für das Asset Management  
 
2005 
61.  Löchel, Horst / Polleit, Thorsten 
A case for money in the ECB monetary policy strategy  
 
2005 
60.  Richard, Jörg / Schalast, Christoph / Schanz, Kay-Michael 
Unternehmen im Prime Standard - „Staying Public“ oder „Going Private“? - Nutzenanalyse der Börsennotiz -  
 
2004 
59.  Heun, Michael / Schlink, Torsten 
Early Warning Systems of Financial Crises - Implementation of a currency crisis model for Uganda  
 
2004 
58.  Heimer, Thomas / Köhler, Thomas 
Auswirkungen des Basel II Akkords auf österreichische KMU 
 
2004 
57.  Heidorn, Thomas / Meyer, Bernd / Pietrowiak, Alexander 
Performanceeffekte nach Directors´Dealings in Deutschland, Italien und den Niederlanden 
 
2004 
56.  Gerdesmeier, Dieter / Roffia, Barbara 
The Relevance of real-time data in estimating reaction functions for the euro area 
 
2004 
55.  Barthel, Erich / Gierig, Rauno / Kühn, Ilmhart-Wolfram 
Unterschiedliche Ansätze zur Messung des Humankapitals 
 
2004 
54.  Anders, Dietmar / Binder, Andreas / Hesdahl, Ralf / Schalast, Christoph / Thöne, Thomas 
Aktuelle Rechtsfragen des Bank- und Kapitalmarktrechts I :  




53.  Polleit, Thorsten 
The Slowdown in German Bank Lending – Revisited 
 
2004 
52.  Heidorn, Thomas / Siragusano, Tindaro 
Die Anwendbarkeit der Behavioral Finance im Devisenmarkt 
 
2004 
51.  Schütze, Daniel / Schalast, Christoph (Hrsg.)  
Wider die Verschleuderung von Unternehmen durch Pfandversteigerung 
 
2004 
50.  Gerhold, Mirko / Heidorn, Thomas  
Investitionen und Emissionen von Convertible Bonds (Wandelanleihen)  
 
2004 
49.  Chevalier, Pierre / Heidorn, Thomas / Krieger, Christian 
Temperaturderivate zur strategischen Absicherung von Beschaffungs- und Absatzrisiken  
 
2003 
48.  Becker, Gernot M. / Seeger, Norbert 
Internationale Cash Flow-Rechnungen aus Eigner- und Gläubigersicht  
 
2003 
47.  Boenkost, Wolfram / Schmidt, Wolfgang M. 
Notes on convexity and quanto adjustments for interest rates and related options 
 
2003 
46.  Hess, Dieter 
Determinants of the relative price impact of unanticipated Information in 
U.S. macroeconomic releases 
 
2003 
45.  Cremers, Heinz / Kluß, Norbert / König, Markus  
Incentive Fees. Erfolgsabhängige Vergütungsmodelle deutscher Publikumsfonds 
 
2003 
44.  Heidorn, Thomas / König, Lars 
Investitionen in Collateralized Debt Obligations 
 
2003 
43.  Kahlert, Holger / Seeger, Norbert 
Bilanzierung von Unternehmenszusammenschlüssen nach US-GAAP 
 
2003 
42.  Beiträge von Studierenden des Studiengangs BBA 012 unter Begleitung von Prof. Dr. Norbert Seeger 
Rechnungslegung im Umbruch - HGB-Bilanzierung im Wettbewerb mit den internationalen  
Standards nach IAS und US-GAAP 
 
2003 
41.  Overbeck, Ludger / Schmidt, Wolfgang 
Modeling Default Dependence with Threshold Models 
 
2003 
40.  Balthasar, Daniel / Cremers, Heinz / Schmidt, Michael 
Portfoliooptimierung mit Hedge Fonds unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Risikokomponente 
 
2002 Energy Service Companies in China: The Role of Social Networks and Trust 
 
 
Frankfurt School of Finance & Management 
Working Paper No. 168   35 
 
39.  Heidorn, Thomas / Kantwill, Jens 
Eine empirische Analyse der Spreadunterschiede von Festsatzanleihen zu Floatern im Euroraum 




38.  Böttcher, Henner / Seeger, Norbert 
Bilanzierung von Finanzderivaten nach HGB, EstG, IAS und US-GAAP 
 
2003 
37.  Moormann, Jürgen 
Terminologie und Glossar der Bankinformatik 
 
2002 
36.  Heidorn, Thomas 
Bewertung von Kreditprodukten und Credit Default Swaps 
 
2001 
35.  Heidorn, Thomas / Weier, Sven 
Einführung in die fundamentale Aktienanalyse 
 
2001 
34.  Seeger, Norbert 
International Accounting Standards (IAS) 
 
2001 
33.  Moormann, Jürgen / Stehling, Frank 
Strategic Positioning of E-Commerce Business Models in the Portfolio of Corporate Banking 
 
2001 
32.  Sokolovsky, Zbynek / Strohhecker, Jürgen 
Fit für den Euro, Simulationsbasierte Euro-Maßnahmenplanung für Dresdner-Bank-Geschäftsstellen 
 
2001 
31.  Roßbach, Peter 
Behavioral Finance - Eine Alternative zur vorherrschenden Kapitalmarkttheorie? 
 
2001 
30.  Heidorn, Thomas / Jaster, Oliver / Willeitner, Ulrich 
Event Risk Covenants 
 
2001 
29.  Biswas, Rita / Löchel, Horst 
Recent Trends in U.S. and German Banking: Convergence or Divergence? 
 
2001 
28.  Eberle, Günter Georg / Löchel, Horst 
Die Auswirkungen des Übergangs zum Kapitaldeckungsverfahren in der Rentenversicherung auf die Kapitalmärkte 
 
2001 
27.  Heidorn, Thomas / Klein, Hans-Dieter / Siebrecht, Frank 
Economic Value Added zur Prognose der Performance europäischer Aktien 
 
2000 
26.  Cremers, Heinz 
Konvergenz der binomialen Optionspreismodelle gegen das Modell von Black/Scholes/Merton 
 
2000 
25.  Löchel, Horst 
Die ökonomischen Dimensionen der ‚New Economy‘ 
 
2000 
24.  Frank, Axel / Moormann, Jürgen 
Grenzen des Outsourcing: Eine Exploration am Beispiel von Direktbanken  
 
2000 
23.  Heidorn, Thomas / Schmidt, Peter / Seiler, Stefan 
Neue Möglichkeiten durch die Namensaktie 
 
2000 
22.  Böger, Andreas / Heidorn, Thomas / Graf Waldstein, Philipp 
Hybrides Kernkapital für Kreditinstitute 
 
2000 




20.  Wolf, Birgit 
Die Eigenmittelkonzeption des § 10 KWG 
 
2000 
19.  Cremers, Heinz / Robé, Sophie / Thiele, Dirk 
Beta als Risikomaß - Eine Untersuchung am europäischen Aktienmarkt 
 
2000 




17.  Cremers, Heinz 
Value at Risk-Konzepte für Marktrisiken 
 
1999 
16.  Chevalier, Pierre / Heidorn, Thomas / Rütze, Merle 
Gründung einer deutschen Strombörse für Elektrizitätsderivate 
 
1999 




14.  Jochum, Eduard 
Hoshin Kanri / Management by Policy (MbP) 
 
1999 




12.  Heidorn, Thomas 
Kreditrisiko (CreditMetrics) 
 





Frankfurt School of Finance & Management 
Working Paper No. 168 
 
11.  Moormann, Jürgen 
Terminologie und Glossar der Bankinformatik 
 
1999 
10.  Löchel, Horst 
The EMU and the Theory of Optimum Currency Areas 
 
1998 
09.  Löchel, Horst 
Die Geldpolitik im Währungsraum des Euro 
 
1998 
08.  Heidorn, Thomas / Hund, Jürgen 
Die Umstellung auf die Stückaktie für deutsche Aktiengesellschaften 
 
1998 
07.  Moormann, Jürgen 
Stand und Perspektiven der Informationsverarbeitung in Banken 
 
1998 
06.  Heidorn, Thomas / Schmidt, Wolfgang 
LIBOR in Arrears 
 
1998 
05.  Jahresbericht 1997  1998 
04.  Ecker, Thomas / Moormann, Jürgen 
Die Bank als Betreiberin einer elektronischen Shopping-Mall 
 
1997 
03.  Jahresbericht 1996  1997 
02.  Cremers, Heinz / Schwarz, Willi 
Interpolation of Discount Factors 
 
1996 
01.  Moormann, Jürgen 




FRANKFURT SCHOOL / HFB – WORKING PAPER SERIES  
CENTRE FOR PRACTICAL QUANTITATIVE FINANCE 
No.  Author/Title  Year 
28.  Beyna, Ingo / Wystup, Uwe 
Characteristic Functions in the Cheyette Interest Rate Model 
2011 
27.  Detering, Nils / Weber, Andreas / Wystup, Uwe 
Return distributions of equity-linked retirement plans 
2010 
26.  Veiga, Carlos / Wystup, Uwe 
Ratings of Structured Products and Issuers’ Commitments 
2010 
25.  Beyna, Ingo / Wystup, Uwe 
On the Calibration of the Cheyette. Interest Rate Model 
2010 
24.  Scholz, Peter / Walther, Ursula 
Investment Certificates under German Taxation. Benefit or Burden for Structured Products’ Performance 
2010 
23.  Esquível, Manuel L. / Veiga, Carlos / Wystup, Uwe 
Unifying Exotic Option Closed Formulas 
2010 
22.  Packham, Natalie / Schlögl, Lutz / Schmidt, Wolfgang M. 
Credit gap risk in a first passage time model with jumps 
 
2009 
21.  Packham, Natalie / Schlögl, Lutz / Schmidt, Wolfgang M. 
Credit dynamics in a first passage time model with jumps 
 
2009 
20.  Reiswich, Dimitri / Wystup, Uwe 
FX Volatility Smile Construction 
 
2009 
19.  Reiswich, Dimitri / Tompkins, Robert 
Potential PCA Interpretation Problems for Volatility Smile Dynamics 
 
2009 
18.  Keller-Ressel, Martin / Kilin, Fiodar 
Forward-Start Options in the Barndorff-Nielsen-Shephard Model 
 
2008 
17.  Griebsch, Susanne / Wystup, Uwe 
On the Valuation of Fader and Discrete Barrier Options in Heston’s Stochastic Volatility Model 
 
2008 
16.  Veiga, Carlos / Wystup, Uwe 
Closed Formula for Options with Discrete Dividends and its Derivatives 
 
2008 Energy Service Companies in China: The Role of Social Networks and Trust 
 
 
Frankfurt School of Finance & Management 
Working Paper No. 168   37 
 
15.  Packham, Natalie / Schmidt, Wolfgang 
Latin hypercube sampling with dependence and applications in finance 
 
2008 
14.  Hakala, Jürgen / Wystup, Uwe 
FX Basket Options 
 
2008 
13.  Weber, Andreas / Wystup, Uwe 
Vergleich von Anlagestrategien bei Riesterrenten ohne Berücksichtigung von Gebühren. Eine Simulationsstudie zur 
Verteilung der Renditen 
 
2008         
12.  Weber, Andreas / Wystup, Uwe 
Riesterrente im Vergleich. Eine Simulationsstudie zur Verteilung der Renditen 
 
2008 




10.  Wystup, Uwe 
Foreign Exchange Quanto Options 
 
2008 
09.  Wystup, Uwe 
Foreign Exchange Symmetries 
 
2008 
08.  Becker, Christoph / Wystup, Uwe 
Was kostet eine Garantie? Ein statistischer Vergleich der Rendite von langfristigen Anlagen 
 
2008 
07.  Schmidt, Wolfgang 
Default Swaps and Hedging Credit Baskets 
 
2007 
06.  Kilin, Fiodar 
Accelerating the Calibration of Stochastic Volatility Models 
 
2007 
05.  Griebsch, Susanne/ Kühn, Christoph / Wystup, Uwe 
Instalment Options: A Closed-Form Solution and the Limiting Case 
 
2007 
04.  Boenkost, Wolfram / Schmidt, Wolfgang M. 
Interest Rate Convexity and the Volatility Smile 
 
2006 
03.  Becker, Christoph/ Wystup, Uwe  
On the Cost of Delayed Currency Fixing Announcements 
 
2005 
02.  Boenkost, Wolfram / Schmidt, Wolfgang M.  
Cross currency swap valuation 
 
2004 
01.  Wallner, Christian / Wystup, Uwe 




HFB – SONDERARBEITSBERICHTE DER HFB - BUSINESS SCHOOL OF FINANCE & MANAGEMENT  
No.  Author/Title  Year 
01.  Nicole Kahmer / Jürgen Moormann 
Studie zur Ausrichtung von Banken an Kundenprozessen am Beispiel des Internet 









Frankfurt School of Finance & Management 
Working Paper No. 168 
 







Order address / contact 
Frankfurt School of Finance & Management 
Sonnemannstr. 9 – 11  ￿  D – 60314 Frankfurt/M.  ￿  Germany 
Phone: +49 (0) 69 154 008 – 734  ￿  Fax: +49 (0) 69 154 008 – 728 
eMail: e.lahdensuu@fs.de 
Further information about Frankfurt School of Finance & Management 
may be obtained at: http://www.fs.de 